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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
From its own rigid prohibition in Wilson, to its application of the
self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment to the States in Malloy,
the Court in Griffin by closing the circle has imposed the federal stan-
dard upon the States; for the procedural self-incrimination clause must
not only be "a matter of local concern."1
The concept of prohibiting self-incrimination grew out of the pro-
tests against the inquisitorial methods of the English ecclesiastical
courts and the Court of Star Chamber, which tortured persons accused
of heresy or treason to obtain confessions. By the latter half of the
seventeenth century the privilege was well-established in English law
and subsequently adopted in the United States.15 Proponents of the
comment rule point to this history and argue that the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth amendment has outlived its usefulness, for the coercive
methods it sought to exterminate are no longer a part of reality. They
contend, as the dissent in Griffin does, that ". . . the lurid realities which
lay behind enactment of the Fifth Amendment, [are] a far cry from the
subject matter of the case before us."' 6 It is submitted, however, that
the Griffin Court, completely cognizant of the far reaching implications
of so subtle a procedural device as the "comment rule," contributed
much to the safeguard of such a fundamental protection as the Constitu-
tion, through the fifth amendment, accords to those accused of crimes.
It is a certainty that the Supreme Court will continue, as it did in Griffin,
to condemn any practice, however slight, of imputing sinister meaning
to the exercise of a person's constitutional right under the fifth amend-
ment.' 7
Frank Intrieri
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-Right to Travel-Area Restrictions-Congres-
sional intent of Passport Act of 1926 and Immigration & Nationality Act
of 1952.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271 (1965).
On March 31, 1962, plaintiff, a Connecticut ski-resort operator, applied
by letter to the Director of the Passport Office for permission to have
his passport validated for travel to Cuba as a tourist. This request was
denied with the explanation that only persons whose travel might be in
the best interests of the United States, such as newsmen and business-
men with previously established interest, could travel to Cuba, and that
14. See dissenting opinion, Id. at 1237.
15. 1 Tresolini, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (1959).
16. See dissenting opinion, Griffin v. California, supra note 4, at 1236.
17. Self Incrimination and the Duty to Testify, 16 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 509 (1954).
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tourists were specifically excluded. Plaintiff persisted in his attempts to
validate his passport for travel to Cuba but to no avail. He then instituted
an action in equity seeking a declaratory judgement decreeing that the
Passport Act of 1926' and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19522
are unconstitutional and a prohibitory injunction directing the Secretary
of State not to enforce the objectionable regulation.' The prayer was
denied in the lower court4 and certiorari was granted by the United States
Supreme Court.'
The questions for decision were whether the Secretary of State is
statutorily authorized to refuse to validate the passports of United States
citizens for travel to Cuba and, if he is, whether the exercise of that
authority is constitutionally permissible. The majority of the Court
answered both questions in the affirmative.6
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, held that, while the
legislative history of the Passport Act of 1926' and its predecessor' does
not affirmatively indicate a congressional intent to authorize area restric-
tions, its language is broad enough to include them. This is further sub-
stantiated by the fact that prior to the enactment of the 1926 Act and
1. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958 ed.) ; Wherein it is stated: "The Secretary of State may grant
and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign coun-
tries by diplomatic representatives of the United States, and by such consul generals, consuls,
or vice consuls when in charge, as the Secretary of State may designate, and by the chief or
other executive officer of the insular possessions of the United States, under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other
person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports?'
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1958 ed.); "(a) When the United States is at war or during the
existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President, ... and the President
shall find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in
addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of
persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation
thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be unlawful. ...
(b) After such proclamation as is provided for in subsection (a) of this section has been
made and published and while such proclamation is in force, it shall, except as otherwise
provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President
may authorize and prescribe, be, unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from
or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid
passport."
3. C.F.R. § 51.75: "The Secretary of State is authorized in his discretion to refuse to
issue a passport, to restrict a passport for use only in certain countries, to restrict it against
use in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a
passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries."
4. Zemel v. Rusk, 228 F. Supp. 65 (D.C.D. Conn. 1964). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2282,
a three-judge court was impanelled. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of this procedure
in its decision.
5. Zemel v. Rusk, 379 U.S. 809 (1964).
6. Justices Black, Douglas and Goldberg wrote separate dissenting opinions.
7. See note 1, supra.
8. Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 52, 60, 61.
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preceding the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952)1
the State Department on various occasions, in both times of peace and
periods of war, had imposed area restrictions. Utilizing the State Depart-
ment's interpretation of these statutes ° and the failure of Congress to re-
ject their interpretation," the Court concluded that Congress intended to
authorize area restrictions.
In deciding that statutorily authorized area restrictions do not violate
the due process clause of the fifth amendment, the Court said: "the
requirements of due process are a function not only of the extent of
governmental restrictions imposed, but also of the extent of the necessity
for the restriction."'" By balancing the interest of the United States
against the deprivation of liberty of the individual, the Court concluded
that the due process clause did not give Zemel the right to travel to Cuba.
The internationl repercussions of unrestricted travel to Cuba would,
in light of the present status of the "cold war," in all probability involve
the United States in international entanglements which can and are being
avoided by area restriction.
The first amendment objections to travel bans found in Kent v. Dulles8
and in Aptheker v. Secretary of State" were of a diminished qualitative
value in Zemel v. Rusk. In the former cases the petitioners were refused
passports because of their association with Communism; whereas in
Zemel the area rather than the person was restricted. The Court there-
fore rejected appellant's argument that the restriction had deprived
him of his first amendment liberties.
One issue that was left unanswered by the Court was the constitution-
ality of criminal prosecutions for those persons who travel abroad with-
out passports. 15 The Court deliberately avoided this issue because there
was no threat of prosecution in the Zemel case.
The Supreme Court in Zemel, with an extremely loose interpretation
of statutory language,'" has placed limitations on the individual's liberty
to travel and at the same time increased the centralized authority of the
government, and especially that of the executive branch, over international
travel. At one end of the pendulum is the fear of an "iron curtain" method
9. See note 2, supra.
10. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1964).
11. Norwegian Nitrogen Product Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933); Costonzo
v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341 (1932); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
12. Zernel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14, 85 Sup. Ct. 1271, 1279 (1965).
13.,357 U.S. 116 (1958).
14. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1185(c) (1958 ed.).
16. Justice Goldberg in his dissent argued that Congress in 1926 merely tried to "cen-
tralize the issuance of passports," which were once wildly dispensed by United States mayors
and even notaries.
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of travel restriction and at the opposite end lurks the danger of inter-
national entanglements and violations of the rights of American citizens
in foreign countries caused by unrestrained liberty to travel to countries
which have shown themselves to be irresponsive to the demands of inter-
national law. While recognizing these two extremes, the Court has bal-
anced the probabilities of their development. Area restriction, unlike
that which faced the Court in earlier travel cases,' 7 has a lesser potential
for creating undue burdens on the individual's liberty; whereas it has an
increased potential over other types of restrictions in shielding the gov-
ernment and the traveler from entanglements with irresponsible foreign
governments. By balancing these factors the Court has come to a rea-
sonable compromise with the earlier cases.' 8
F. Regan Nerone
17. Compare, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378
U.S. 500 (1964).
18. Ibid.

